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Abstract
We model the political process as consisting of voting on the issue considered salient,
public expenditure, with a subsequent consensus over size of government and income tax-
ation. We prove that for each majoritarian choice there is a unique consensus policy on
progressivity and government size. We empirically validate the implication that the sign
of the relationship between inequality and progressivity chosen by the median voter is con-
ditional on the degree of substitutability between government and market supplied goods.
We also obtain that this substitutability has a negative impact on the negative marginal
effect of inequality on the size of government.
JEL-Classification: H23, H50, 050.
Key-words: Government Policy, Income Taxation, Public Expenditure.
1Esteban and Mayoral research has been funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CICYT
(ECO2011-25293). Useful comments by Jordi Caballe, Eliana la Ferrara and Kalle Moene are gratefully
acknowledged. Andrew Gianou has provided us with a highly competent research assistance.
2Esteban: Institut d’Ana`lisi Econo´mica, CSIC, and Barcelona GSE; joan.esteban@iae.csic.es. Mayoral:
Institut d’Ana`lisi Econo´mica, CSIC and Barcelona GSE; laura.mayoral@iae.csic.es.
21. Introduction
Much of public finance has treated taxation and expenditure separately. The literature
on income redistribution through taxes and cash transfers treats the net tax revenue as
given and [implicitly] disregards how this revenue is spent. Likewise, the bulk of the
public expenditure literature deals with the allocation of the budget over the different
goods and services publicly provided, independently of taxation. Finally, there is also the
highly debated question of the size of government in the economy. This paper provides an
integrated analysis of these three dimensions of public finance.3
We model the choice over these three dimensions of public finance in line with the
standard approach in political science by which the political debate and the vote are focused
on a few salient issues while the rest is later resolved in a consensual way.4 Empirical
evidence strongly suggests that, among these policies, partisan confrontation essentially
focuses on public spending and size of government.5 We examine the case in which the
expenditure policy is chosen by majority voting. Given this choice, the income tax schedule
and the size of government are designed so as to achieve consensus among the population,
3The links between taxation and expenditure have been studied in theoretical welfare economics: Ar-
row (1971), Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996), Blomquist and Christiansen (1995, 1998), Blomquist et
al. (2010), Boadway and Marchand (1995), Cremer and Gahvari (1997), Guesnerie and Roberts (1984),
Meltzer and Richard (1985), and Pirttila and Tuomala (2002). In Besley and Coate (1991) and in Epple
and Romano (1996) individuals vote over the quality/level of the public provision of a good and the budget
balancing proportional income tax. See the survey by Balestrino (1999).
The macroeconomics literature has also given some attention whether public and private expenditures are
complements or substitutes: Barro (1981), Aschauer (1985), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter
and King (1993), Karras (1994), Ahmed and Yoo (1995), Ambler and Cardia (1997), Amano and Wirjanto
(1998), and Cardia, Kozhaya, and Ruge-Murcia (2003) are all relevant contributions [more later].
4See Wlezien, C. (2005) for a survey on saliency in politics and how to measure it.
5In their codification of party manifestos in all democratic countries since 1945, Budge et al (2001, 2006) do
not include as an entry neither income taxation nor income redistribution. In contrast, public expenditures
such as environment, culture, social services, social security, health, or education represent nearly twenty
percent of the total entries. Indeed, Cusack and Baramendi (2006), Ganghof (2005), Swank and Steinmo
(2002), and Wagshal (2001), find no support for the influence of government composition on income
taxation, while Bruninger (2005) and Tsebelis and Chang (2004) do find evidence of a significant effect
on the type of public spending. In an influential paper, Przevorski (1999) makes the point that political
struggles over spending levels may partly be fought as struggles over tax structure (p.43). On this respect,
Cusack and Fuchs (2002) argue that this is so because large parts of welfare spending do not come in the
form of transfers but rather as services and goods provided by the state (p.17). Also Howard (1997) and
Ervik (2000) underscore the relevance of the “hidden” welfare provision.
3thus avoiding an additional line of political confrontation.6 We also study the case in
which the political debate is focused on the size of government while the composition of
public spending and the income tax are obtained via consensus. The model endogenously
determines the consensus income tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and
the size of government.7 We obtain that inequality is negatively related to the size of
government and to the redistributive egalitarian bias in public expenditure, and positively
or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending upon substitutability between
government supplied and market goods.
In our model income is taxed and the net tax revenue is used to finance the quasi private
goods and services provided by the government.8 As in Arrow (1971), we assume that
the government can target the individual beneficiaries of its expenditure by choosing the
weight given to types of expenditure that mostly benefit each specific segment of the income
ladder. We consider two different expenditure principles. One is egalitarianism, providing
a uniform benefit across the population. The other is incentive motivated and provides
benefits in accordance to the individual fiscal effort. We parametrize the expenditure
policies by the relative weight given to the egalitarian principle.
6See Bandyopadhyay and Esteban (2009) for a first exploration of the idea of consensual taxation and its
empirical implications.
7Taking the recent report by the US National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform as a
reference point, the opinions of some of the members [available at www.fiscalcommission.gov.] seem in
line with our approach. That changes in taxation and in expenditure are linked to each other is plain in
congressman Jeb Hensarling’s words: “... further tax increases on the American people should be off the
table. If put on the table, as they are in this plan, fundamental health care reform and a total spending cap
must be put on the table as well.” Senator Kent Conrad insists on this point and also on the need for a
bipartisan consensus: “Our obligation was not just to produce a plan that would bring America back from
the brink, but to do so in a bipartisan way. And just as Senator Gregg and I believed was so important,
everything was on the table —spending and revenues. The Commissioners, just like Congress, would have
to make compromises to get this important job done.” This view of tax reform as a compromise rather
than a confrontation is also present in similar discussions in other countries. Chris Wales, former advisor
to the UK former Labor prime minister Gordon Brown, expressed the view that: “In practice, there is
little constructive debate even then about the level of taxation and even less about the way in which it is
levied. (...) The result is that [in the Parliament] there is almost no examination of the design of the tax
system as a whole. (...) The search for fairness may ultimately be futile. The search for a broad consensus
is certainly not.”, at “Time for a new consensus on tax”, The Telegraph (18/10/2007).
8Notice that the income that constitutes the tax base includes social security transfers. Hence, we are
not dealing with how such transfers are determined. The redistributive task of the government via money
transfers has been the object of extensive studies by Moene and Wallerstein (2001a), (2001b) and (2003)
and Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
4The impact of the public provision of goods on individual well-being critically depends
on the substitutability relative to the ones individuals purchase in the market. This will
also be critical with respect to attitudes of the rich towards taxation. For instance, when
security was the monopoly of the state police, rich individuals with a high demand for
security had to accept a well-funded government because there was no substitute in the
market. As it turns out, this substitutability plays a key role in the relationship between
inequality and income taxation and size of government. We take this substitutability as
given and leave for future research the rationale of the privatisation of public services.
What is the net value added of our shifting of partisan competition from taxes to public
expenditure or size of government? Besides bringing the model closer to what appears
to be the actual political process, this shift yields three interesting novel insights: (i) it
brings into stage the interdependence between taxation and distributive expenditure; (ii)
it unveils the impact of public decisions modifying the substitutability between publicly
supplied goods and market goods, and (iii) it explains why inequality has a non-monotonic
relationship with income tax progressivity.
We bring the model to data and find empirical support for the two main implications of
our model:
[1] There is a positive relationship between the marginal tax rate and inequality when the
elasticity of substitution is low, and a negative relationship when the elasticity is high.
The analysis of the relationship between redistribution and inequality has been domi-
nated by the politico-economic model of majority voting over linear income taxes. This
literature was initiated by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981).
In this model the chosen tax is the one preferred by the median income voter, and hence
more inequality —increasing the relative gap between mean and median income— leads
to more redistribution. Intuitive as it may sound, this theory has been unable to obtain
5convincing empirical support.9 In contrast, our empirical results show that there is a re-
lationship between taxation and inequality, once its sign is conditioned to the elasticity of
substitution public/private.
[2] The size of government is negatively related to inequality. In addition, the marginal
effect of inequality on the size of government is larger (in absolute value) the lower the
value of the substitutability.
Our second empirical result refines the finding of a negative relationship between total
government expenditure and inequality,10 by introducing in the discussion that the critical
variable is the interaction between inequality and substitutability.
The paper is organized as follows. In section ?? we present the model. In section ?? we
develop the notion of consensus and obtain the policy that will result from majoritarian
vote on either composition of government spending or on size of government and obtain
the corresponding consensual other fiscal policies. Section ?? empirically tests the two
main implications of our model and section ?? concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A.
Appendix B presents some tables related to the empirical analysis that are not included
in the main text.
2. The Model
We assume a continuum of individuals with income denoted by y. Individual income is
exogenous and distributed over the population with cdf F with support [a,∞), a > 0. We
9Borck (2007) concludes in his survey that there is no solid evidence in support of the critical role of
the median income voter. An updated survey of the negative empirical results can be found in Scervini
(2012). Moene and Wallerstein (2003) find that redistributive social transfers appear to be uncorrelated
with inequality while insurance seems negatively correlated with inequality. Mello and Tiongson (2003)
also find that higher inequality goes with lower spending in redistribution. But Shelton (2007) finds that
increased inequality results in strong increases of transfers.
10Schwabish et al (2006) find that higher pre-tax market income inequality leads to lower levels of non-
elderly social spending. Moene and Wallerstein (2003), Shelton (2007) and Longoni and Gregorini (2009)
find that income inequality has no influence on the aggregate provision of public goods. Husted and Kenny
(1997) and Rodr´ıguez (1999) find that higher income inequality among voters following an enlargement of
the franchise has the effect of enlarging the size of government.
6are thus implicitly assuming a rigid labor supply.11 We shall denote the average per capita
income by µ.
Individual preferences are defined over private consumption x and a publicly supplied
good g. The publicly supplied good can be public or private in nature or a mixture of the
two. The essential distinguishing feature here is that x is purchased in the market while g
is fixed by the government. Individual preferences are represented by u(x, g).
On individual preferences we make the following standard assumption:
Assumption 1. ux > 0, ug > 0, uxx < 0, ugg < 0 and uxg > 0. For g > 0, lim
x→0
ux =
∞ and lim
x→∞
ux = 0, and for x > 0, lim
g→0
ug =∞ and lim
g→∞
ug = 0.
Let t(y), 0 ≤ t(y) ≤ y, denote the tax paid by an individual with income y. The entire
disposable income is consumed and hence
(1) x(y) = y − t(y).
We denote by t¯ the per capita net tax revenue, i.e.
(2) t¯ =
∫
t(y)dF (y).
The net tax revenue is used to finance the provision of the publicly supplied commodities.
Suppose we could transform an amount z of private consumption into publicly supplied
good. Then, the utility of shifting z is u(y − z, z). Consider now the utility maximizing z
for an individual with income y. Let us denote by z(y) this optimal shift of resources from
private to publicly supplied goods. Then we have that z(y) solves
(3) ux(y − z(y), z(y)) = ug(y − z(y), z(y)).
We denote by zˆ the share of the average shift over per capita income, that is, zˆ =∫
z(y)dF (y)/µ. This is a useful benchmark as it gives us the relative size on GDP of the
11Most of the models on public expenditure consider individual incomes as given. This is the case of Arrow
(1971), Usher (1977), Epple and Romano (1996), or Besley and Coate (2001). In any case, as we will show
at the end of subsection ??, this assumption does not alter our essential results.
7publicly supplied good if each individual had to choose the allocation between private and
public that is optimal to her, in absence of redistribution.
We are interested in the type of goods and services provided by the government. The
structure of the public expenditure is important because, by choosing the weight allocated
to the different types of goods and services, it establishes the distribution of its benefits.
Transferring resources from primary education or from health to research, for instance,
tilts the benefits of public expenditure towards rewarding the tax effort of the high tax-
payers. Although we will treat public expenditure as an aggregate, we want our model to
capture the distributive bias implicit in expenditure policy. As we have already argued,
in the political debate the preference over the size of government comes together with an
associated expenditure and taxation policy.
A stark way of representing the distributional impact of public expenditure is to consider
the chosen policy as a compromise between two principles that seem to inspire the debate.
On the one hand, we have the principle of universal and equal treatment of all the citi-
zens. This principle recommends a structure of public expenditure that produces an equal
benefit across the board. On the other hand, we have the notion of making the benefits
of governmental action to be proportionate to the fiscal effort exerted by the different tax
payers.12 The stronger the role of the egalitarian principle, the more beneficial to the poor
the policy will be.
We shall consider public expenditure as a compromise between the two extreme cases
of the distribution of benefits from public supply of goods and services. In the first case,
public expenditure fully adheres to the egalitarian policy and chooses a structure of public
expenditure that yields an equal benefit to all the citizens, g(y) = g¯. The second benchmark
corresponds to the case in which public spending is fully responsive to the principle of
rewarding the taxpayer effort and thus returns as benefits to each taxpayer the exact
amount of taxes paid, g(y) = t(y).
12When discussing the principles for tax reform, US senator Tom Coburn states that “those who benefit
from the taxes of others have an obligation to pay their own taxes and be better stewards of the hard-
earned dollars they have been entrusted.” National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform
http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/MemberStatements.pdf.
8We consider the family of expenditure policies that are intermediate between these two
extreme positions. An expenditure policy specifies the benefits at each income level y as a
weighted combination of the two benchmark policies.13 Therefore, we define an expenditure
policy as the convex linear combination of the two extreme policies, where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the
weight to the egalitarian policy so that:
(4) g(y, γ) = γg¯ + (1− γ)t(y).
The larger the value of γ the more redistributive the expenditure policy is. The size of
government is ϑ = g¯
µ
.
A fiscal policy will thus consist of an income tax and an expenditure policy:
[
t(·), g¯, γ].
Later we will require that the chosen fiscal policies be balanced, that is,
(5) g¯ ≡
∫
g(y)dF (y) = γg¯ + (1− γ)
∫
t(y)dF (y) = γg¯ + (1− γ)t¯ = t¯ = ϑµ.
The utility of an individual with income y from the fiscal policy
[
t(·), γ] [maybe unbal-
anced] is
(6) u
(
y − t(y), γg¯ + (1− γ)t(y)).
Let us now consider the marginal utility of publicly supplied goods ug for an individual
with income y and paying taxes t(y). A marginal increase in the tax paid will decrease
private consumption and increase the consumption of the publicly provided good, because
of one’s higher deservingness. The joint effect of these changes clearly is a decrease in ug.
Our assumption is that the elasticity of this change in the marginal utility of the publicly
provided good is less than unity. Formally, our assumption is as follows.
Assumption 2. We assume that for all incomes and all γ ∈ (0, 1)
(7) −t(y)
ug
∂ug
∂t(y)
≤ 1.
We are now set for the study of the choice of fiscal policies.
13This class of policies is a specification of the targeted expenditure policies considered in Arrow (1971).
93. Choice of Fiscal Policy
We assume that, given the voted expenditure policy, the political actors —political
parties, civil servants, parliamentary committees, lobbies, or expert advisors— look for a
reform of the distribution of the tax burden that minimizes controversy and no additional
front of party confrontation is left open. Indeed we show that for any given expenditure
policy there exists a unique consensual tax function, with the corresponding net tax revenue
and the budget balancing size of government. Knowing that the tax will be adapted to
make it consensual, the expenditure policy is chosen by majority voting. Consequently, we
have a simultaneous determination of expenditure and taxation policies.
We solve the problem backwards. We first show that for each expenditure policy γ
a unique balanced consensual tax schedule t(·) exists. Then we deal with voting over
expenditure policy γ.
3.1. Consensual fiscal policy. Consider any arbitrary expenditure policy γ. We shall
show that for any such policy there is a unique g¯ and balanced income tax function t(y)
that is consensual.
A tax function is any strictly increasing function from < to < with any arbitrary net
tax revenue t¯ satisfying that t(y) ∈ [0, y].
For any arbitrary g¯, the tax function t(·) is acceptable to an individual with income
y if she does not wish to vary its progressivity and it is consensual if it is unanimously
acceptable and balanced.
In order to operationalize the notion of “variation of the progressivity” of t(·) —without
varying the net tax revenue— we focus on affine transformations t˜(·) that satisfy:
(8) t˜(y) = t¯+ β[t(y)− t¯].
For any given (g¯, γ), the valuation of a change in progressiveness by β of the tax t(·) by
an individual with income y will be
(9) u
(
y − [t¯+ β(t(y)− t¯)], γg¯ + [1− γ][t¯+ β(t(y)− t¯)]).
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Given the fiscal policy
(
t(·), g¯, γ) we denote by β∗(t(y), γ, y) the change that would be
preferred by an individual with income y. Since the utility is strictly concave in β, the
most preferred change in progressiveness can be obtained from the first order condition.
Definition 1 (i) A fiscal policy
(
t(·), g¯, γ) is individually acceptable to a person with income
y if β∗(t(y), g¯, γ, y) = 1. The set of tax functions acceptable to an individual with income
y is denoted by =(y, g¯, γ).
(ii) A fiscal policy
(
t(·), g¯, γ) is consensual if it is unanimously acceptable and balanced,
that is, if t(·) ∈ ⋂
y
=(y, g¯, γ) ≡ =(γ) with t¯ = g¯.
Proposition 1. Let individual preferences satisfy Assumption ??. For any income distri-
bution F (·) and any given γ ∈ (0, 1) the set =(γ) is non-empty and contains one single
element only.
Let us pause to underscore four points on the result.
[1] The first point refers to the restriction on the tax function: the set =(y, g, γ) contains
tax functions yielding very different aggregate tax revenues. The restriction that a tax
function is consensual, and hence acceptable to all, selects not only the consensual steepness
of the tax function, but its net revenue as well. The aggregate tax revenue —and hence
the size of government ϑ— is determined together with the shape of the tax function.
[2] Our second point concerns the importance of the assumption that incomes are ex-
ogenous. The existence of a consensual tax function remains intact with an elastic labor
supply. To see this observe that, written in compact form, the preferred β implies that
du
dβ
= du
dt(y)
[t(y)− t¯] = 0. We then examine the implications that this condition is satisfied
for β = 1 for all incomes. Now income would be y = w`, where ` is labor supply and
w the wage rate. Preferences will now (negatively) depend on a third commodity: labor
supply `. The utility maximizing choice of ` would entail that the total marginal effect
on utility be zero, that is, that du
d`
= 0. Now, the effect on the utility of a change in β
depends on the total direct effect on utility of changing the tax, together with the induced
change in utility via the change in labor supply. This total change has to equal zero. If we
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compute the total change we now have du
dt(y)
[t(y)− t¯] + du
d`
d`
dt(y)
[t(y)− t¯] that, by an envelope
argument, reduces to the previous expression du
dt(y)
[t(y)− t¯] = 0. We have opted for a rigid
labor supply for the sake of the clarity of our arguments.
[3] Our third point wishes to stress that consensual taxes are welfare maximizing relative
to the other tax schedules with the same net tax revenue.14 Notice that the requirement
that for the chosen t(·) no one can improve upon by local affine transformations is in fact
a variational condition to characterize a function that maximizes the sum of individual
utilities.
[4] Finally, Proposition ?? can be reworded for the case of a given size of government ϑ
and balanced and consensual t(·) and γ.
Proposition 2. Let individual preferences satisfy Assumptions ?? and ??. For every
ϑ ∈ [0, zˆ], there always exist a unique consensual and balanced fiscal policy (t∗(·), γ∗).
In sum, given the choice of either the size of government or the bias in public expenditure,
the other fiscal policies can be accommodated so as to avoid a second dimension in the
partisan competition.
In the proof of Proposition ??, we have shown a result that we wish to single out.
Proposition 3. Let preferences satisfy Assumptions ?? and ?? and let ϑ ∈ [0, zˆ]. Then,
over balanced consensual fiscal policies, the egalitarian bias of public expenditure γ is strictly
decreasing in the size of government ϑ.
This is a strong implication of our model of choice of fiscal policy: more egalitarian
minded expenditure policies will be at the cost of reducing the size of government to make
fiscal policy unanimously acceptable.15
14This seems in line with the intuitive argument by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) in The Calculus of Con-
sent: “Any rule for collective choice embodying less than full consensus must impose some external costs
on the individual since resources will tend to be allocated ‘inefficiently because of the choice mechanism”
(p.190)
15This negative relationship seems in line with the discussions of the US National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform. After Obama’s increase in expenditure in health care, the sole main agreement
reached by this commission has been to target a cap on size of government of 21 percent of GDP. This is
four percent points below the size in 2011.
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3.2. Majority Voting over Public Spending. We have already argued that political
scientists have underscored that political confrontation takes place more in the domain
of public expenditure than in the setting of income taxation. We have characterized the
consensus tax function —and the corresponding net tax revenue— as a function of the
expenditure policy. We shall now examine the choice over expenditure policies by majority
voting.
For the choice over expenditure policies we shall simply transpose the analysis of majority
voting over linear income taxes by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard
(1981). Our problem of choice over the pro-poor bias in expenditure policy is formally
similar to the choice over the marginal tax rate t studied in this literature. In fact, a
linear income tax makes disposable income the convex linear combination of the egalitarian
mean income and the individual pre-tax income with weights t and (1 − t), respectively.
Furthermore, when voting for the egalitarian “bias” t, individuals are assumed to be aware
of the effect on labor supply and hence on per capita income. In our case too, voters will
be assumed to take into account that the income tax will be reshuﬄed following the choice
of γ.
We can now show that a majority voting equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 4. Let t(µ) ≤ t¯ and m < µ, with F (m) = 1
2
. Then, a majority voting
equilibrium always exists and the chosen expenditure policy, γ∗, is the one preferred by the
median voter γ(m), that is,
(10) γ∗ = γ(m) =
t¯− t(m)
− dt¯
dγ
.
Likewise, an equilibrium of majority voting over ϑ always exists and consists of the policy
preferred by the median voter.
Our result has a flavor of the classic Meltzer and Richard characterization of the ma-
joritarian linear income tax. In their case, that marginal tax rate was proportional to the
gap between mean and median incomes, measured at the endogenously determined labor
supply. In our case, the chosen egalitarian bias in expenditure policy is proportional to
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the gap between the taxes paid by the mean and median income earners, also measured
at the endogenously determined tax schedule.
We close this subsection with a caveat on the interpretation of the result obtained.
Within the tradition of the political economy of taxation literature, we have modeled the
choice of policy as resulting from majority voting and hence aligned with the preferences
of the median voter. This is indeed a very simplified representation of the working of a
democracy unquestionably far from what we observe in reality. In fact, in our empirical
work, as almost all empirical works on this topic, we shall use the Gini index as a measure
of inequality. This is in line with a broader understanding of the connection between
inequality and the pressure for redistribution.
In the next subsection we derive explicit close form solutions for the case of CES pref-
erences.
3.3. CES preferences. We now restrict individual preferences to be of the CES type.
This will permit us to obtain close forms and examine the effects of income inequality, of
expenditure bias and of the elasticity of substitution on the tax schedule and on the size
of government. In the rest of the paper we shall empirically test the implications of the
model under the CES specification.
The family of CES utility functions is given by:
(11) u(x, g) =
[
x
σ−1
σ + g
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
,
with the elasticity of substitution σ > 0.
The first order condition for a consensus tax now is
(12)
ux (x, g)
ug (x, g)
=
[
y − t(y)
γt¯+ (1− γ)t(y)
]− 1
σ
= 1− γ.
We can thus easily obtain that the consensus income tax is linear
(13) t(y) =
(1− γ)σy − γt¯
(1− γ) + (1− γ)σ .
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Integrating over the incomes y we have that
(14) t¯ =
µ(1− γ)σ
1 + (1− γ)σ = g¯ and ϑ =
(1− γ)σ
1 + (1− γ)σ .
Therefore, the linear tax schedule will have marginal tax rate τ and transfer T
(15) τ =
(1− γ)σ
(1− γ) + (1− γ)σ and T =
γµ[
1 + (1− γ)1−σ][1 + (1− γ)σ] .
Notice that an increase in the egalitarian bias in public spending γ will increase or
decrease the marginal tax rate τ as the elasticity of substitution is smaller or greater than
unity, respectively.
Finally, using (??) the majoritarian expenditure policy γ∗ is implicitly defined by
(16) σγ∗
1 + (1− γ∗)σ−1[
1 + (1− γ∗)σ
]2 = µ−mµ ≡M.
We summarize the results obtained for CES preferences in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5. Let individual preferences be CES and let income inequality be measured
by the index M . Then we have that:
(1) the egalitarian bias in public spending γ is strictly increasing in inequality;
(2) the size of government ϑ is strictly decreasing in inequality. Further, the marginal
effect of inequality on ϑ is larger (in absolute value) the lower the value of σ; and
(3) the tax schedule is linear and the marginal income tax rate increases or decreases
with inequality as the elasticity σ is smaller or greater than unity.
3.4. Discussion. [1] The degree of substitutability is essential in the relationship between
the egalitarian bias and taxation. To see this, consider the case of publicly supplied goods
with no substitutes in the private market. To have an adequate supply of the indispensable
publicly supplied goods the rich have to accept a high level of taxation, even if they will
also be financing the public supply to the poor. As the expenditure policy becomes more
egalitarian, the rich will have to accept higher taxes. However, if the two types of goods
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are substitutes, the rich will prefer to purchase privately the public ones and the effect of
a more egalitarian expenditure policy will be avoided by reducing taxation.
[2] With no assumptions on the tax function, and with CES preferences, we obtain that
the unique consensual t(·) is a linear tax function. Consider the effect of an increase by
∆ of an income y. Due to the biased expenditure policy, a linear income tax implies that
private and public consumption will also increase at the same rate. If preferences had
a falling elasticity of substitution of private for public consumption, the income increase
would make individuals prefer a more than proportional increase in the supply of the
public good and hence would rather favor an increasing marginal tax rate. If the elasticity
of substitution were to rise individuals would have a preference for declining marginal tax
rates. Clearly, whether individuals unanimously support a tax function with increasing
or decreasing marginal tax rates critically depends upon the change in the elasticity of
substitution as the consumption levels rise. A similar argument holds for why the tax rate
is shown to be independent of the distribution of income.
[3] In our model, the supply of a subset of commodities is the monopoly of the gov-
ernment. This monopoly provides the government with the coercive power to make indi-
viduals accept taxation on incomes. How effective this power is critically depends upon
the substitutability between this bundle of commodities and the commodities individuals
can purchase in the market. Hence, our approach suggests that the rich will lobby more
strongly for increasing the substitutability between public and private goods by privatizing
as many public services as possible rather than about the shape of the income tax schedule.
4. Empirical Evidence
When preferences have constant-elasticity of substitution, we have been able to obtain
explicit, close-form testable results on the relationship between income inequality and fiscal
policy, as recorded in Proposition ??.
We obtain two types of results. One type is the direct effect of inequality on the chosen
policy. This can be either on the egalitarian bias of expenditure policy or on the size of
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government. The second type is the indirect effect of inequality on income taxation, via
the consensual arrangement associated with the chosen expenditure policy.
In the following we present evidence supporting the direct and indirect effects of income
inequality on fiscal policies. Concerning the direct effects, we have focused on the rela-
tionship between inequality and the size of government. We have good data on the size
of government for a large sample of countries. In contrast, the specification of the notion
of “egalitarian bias” in public expenditure can be controversial, and the data to proxy γ
limited and of questionable interpretation.
Therefore, based on our results in Proposition ??, we test the following two statements:
(1) There is a positive relationship between the marginal tax rate τ and income in-
equality when the elasticity of substitution σ is low, and a negative relationship
when σ is high.16
(2) The size of government ϑ is negatively related to inequality. In addition, the mar-
ginal effect of inequality on the size of government is larger (in absolute value) the
lower the value of σ.
4.1. Data. We use an unbalanced panel of 131 countries for the period 1981-2008. A
description of the variables employed in the empirical analysis is provided below while a
table containing summary statistics is presented in Table ?? in Appendix B.
Dependent variables. Our two dependent variables are τ , the marginal income tax rate,
and the size of government, ϑ. These variables are measured as follows.
• τ is proxied by the top statutory marginal PIT rate, which is defined as the legally
determined marginal tax rate applicable to the top bracket of the personal income
tax schedule. This is the only tax schedule information systematically collected
for a large sample of countries. The data comes from the World Tax Indicators
database, International Center for Public Policy at Georgia State University, see
Sabirianova et al. (2010) for details.
16A first attempt at estimating this relationship is in Bandyopadhyay and Esteban (2009).
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• ϑ is measured as the ratio of the general government final consumption expenditure
as a proportion of total GDP. Data comes from the WDI and GDFs databases from
the World Bank.
Independent variables. The key independent variables in our analysis are income in-
equality and the elasticity of substitution, σ.
• Income inequality is captured in the model by M , the median to mean income gap.
Data on M are only available for a few country/years. Thus, we have opted to proxy
M by the Gini coefficient, G, which is the most popular index of inequality. Data
for G come from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID),
(Solt, 2009). The SWIID provides comparable Gini indices of market and net
income inequality for 153 countries for as many years as possible from 1960 to the
present. We use Gini indices of market income inequality which, according to the
SWIID definition, are based on pre-tax and pre-government transfers income.17
• σ has been proxied as follows.18 The substitutability between the two bundles of
commodities depends upon the nature of individual preferences and on the degree
of monopoly that the government maintains for some subset of commodities, as
discussed earlier. We focus on the latter property since data on public and private
expenditure can be more easily accessed. For many OECD countries the security or
the postal systems, for instance, have been a public monopoly until fairly recently.
Today, however, it is possible to supplement the public supply of police force or
mail services by purchasing additional private security or hiring courier companies.
Our proxy for σ is based on the idea that the larger the share of the expenditure
channelled through the market, the higher the substitutability between the public
and the private provision of these goods. This suggests a simple way to approximate
17This dataset combines data from WIDER and other sources to predict missing values in the LIS “mi”
(market income) series.
18There are numerous studies that have dealt with the estimation of the elasticity of substitution between
public and private goods (i.e., Barro 1981, Aschauer 1985, Karras 1994, Evans and Karras 1996, Bouakez
and Rebei 2006, Auteri and Constantini 2010, etc.). However, most of this literature has paid more
attention to the sign of the cross derivative than to the value of the elasticity itself. In addition, these
studies typically focus on a limited number of countries. Thus, we can’t make use of these estimates in
our empirical analysis.
18
σ as the ratio of private versus public spending on some set of commodities for which
public provision is usually available.19 If all is private, then the elasticity is infinity.
If all is public, then the elasticity is zero. A reasonable candidate is health services,
since they account for a considerable share of total’s government expenditure but
this share varies significantly from country to country.
Thus, we proxy σ as the ratio of private to public expenditure on health. Data
on health expenditures comes from the Global Health Observatory database, World
Health Organization and is available for the period 1995-2008 for a large number of
countries (193). Our proxy for σ, σ∗, is computed as the average of the yearly ratios
of private over public health expenditures for each country. Table ?? in Appendix
B presents the values of this variable for each of the countries in our dataset.
Indeed, this is a rough proxy for the ‘true” elasticities of substitution and in the
best of cases it contains a sizable measurement error. In the empirical part, we
nevertheless try to overcome this limitation by instrumenting σ∗.
Controls. Other variables that have been pointed out to have an impact on public spend-
ing and taxation decisions are also included in our regressions. These control variables
remain the same in all our specifications.
• gdppc. (Log of) income per capita in 2005 PPP dollars, lagged one year (source:
Penn World Tables). The rationale for considering this variable is the observation
of a positive association between the size of the public sector and income per capita
(also known as Wagner’s Law), see Easterly and Rebelo (1993).
• pop: Total population, lagged one year (source: Penn World Tables). Another
classical observation is the fact that larger countries tend to spend less on public
good provision. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) provide two explanations for this fact.
19With CES preferences we have that ux(x,g)ug(x,g) =
[
x
g
]− 1σ
. Hence, we can write
σ = 1−
ln uxxugg
ln uxug
.
Thus, if the variability of uxug across countries is moderate, σ is an increasing function of the ratio between
private to public value of consumption. Notice that from the first order condition (??) we have that
ln uxug = ln(1− γ) < 0.
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First, non-rivalrous public goods are shared over larger populations, which results
in lower per-capita costs of provision. Second, larger populations tend to exhibit
greater heterogeneity in preferences and this often leads to a decrease in public
good provision.
• pop65. Percentage of population above 65 years, lagged one year (source: the
World Bank). A greater fraction of the population over 65 is often associated with
large and significant increases in local government expenditure (Shelton, 2007).
• democ: Democracy indicator, lagged one year (source: Polity IV).20 Our theory
implicitly assumes that the median income and the decisive voter are the same
citizen. However, political rights are restricted to a privileged minority in many
countries. We control for the extent of democracy since our sample includes coun-
tries with quite heterogeneous political institutions.
• Finally, all our regressions include country fixed effects and year dummies.
4.2. The relation between the marginal tax rate and inequality. In this section we
investigate the relationship between the top marginal tax rate, τ, and inequality, which in
Section ?? is established to be conditional upon the value of σ, the elasticity of substitution
between public and private expenditures.
Our model implies that for low values of σ there exists a positive relationship between
τ and inequality, that becomes negative for higher values of σ. A simple way to capture
this relation is to consider a linear regression where the marginal tax rate is regressed on
inequality and inequality interacted with σ∗, our proxy for σ, plus some controls. We would
expect a positive coefficient for inequality and a negative one for the interacted term, such
that for small values of σ∗ the combined effect is positive, but it becomes negative for
larger values.
Reverse causality may pose a problem in our empirical analysis. Firstly, income inequal-
ity may have an effect on the marginal tax rate, as the model postulates. Yet, the amount
20The Democracy indicator ranges from 0 to 10, where higher values indicate better democratic institu-
tions. Three variables are considered to elaborate this indicator: the competitiveness of political partici-
pation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.
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of redistribution that is possible to implement with the raised taxes might also have a
direct effect on inequality. Notice however that our measures of inequality are based on
market income. This is income before taxes have been collected and before redistribution
by the state has taken place. Thus, taxation and social spending have no direct effect on
this type of inequality (Milanovic, 2000).21
Although a direct link between taxes and market income inequality can be ruled out, an
indirect link cannot be discarded. Individual labor supply decisions are likely to be affected
by the welfare state and the degree of taxation. High top marginal rates may induce
households at the higher end of the income distribution to reduce their labor supply, thus
lowering their income. A generous welfare state can have a similar effect at the lower end of
the income distribution, since individuals may prefer to work less and receive compensation
by the state. To address this issue, we lag our measures of inequality and assume that
current changes on the tax rate do not have an impact on lagged inequality. Lagging the
inequality measures has an additional benefit, since it is natural to expect that changes
in the marginal tax rate will occur with some delay with respect to changes in inequality.
Three reasons will justify this lag. Firstly, households will need some time to recognize that
their relative income position has changed. Secondly, elections do not take place annually,
so changes in voter preferences have to wait in most instances until they can effectively
be expressed. And thirdly, newly elected governments will also require time to implement
policy changes.
Secondly, our proxy for the elasticity of substitution between private and public goods,
σ∗, might also be endogenous. Countries with low marginal tax rates might be forced to
have low public spending and, therefore, a high value of σ∗. This would generate a negative
relation between σ∗ and τ , and biased estimators due to reverse causality. We will address
this problem by instrumenting σ∗, see below for a discussion.
21Just to give an idea of how different inequality based on market or net income looks like, consider the
case of Sweden. Sweden is known as being a country with high levels of redistribution and low inequality.
Indeed, its average net income Gini over the period considered in this analysis equals 0.23, which implies
that 98% of the countries of our sample have levels of (net income) inequality that are larger than this
value. However, Sweden’s average market income Gini is 0.44, which is above the inequality’s median
value (55 percentile) and is comparable with that of countries such as Cambodia or Trinidad and Tobago.
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We estimate the following model for several values of j, the inequality lag,
(17) τit = β1Git−j + β2Git−jσ∗i + β3Xit−1 + µi + ηt + it,
where the subscripts i = 1, ..., C and t = 1, ..., T denote country and year, respectively,
G is the Gini coefficient, σ∗i is our proxy for the elasticity of substitution between private
and public goods, Xit−1 is a vector of controls (lagged one year), µi and ηt are country and
year dummies, respectively, and it is the error term. We have estimated the coefficients
using standard fixed-effects and instrumental variable techniques. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering at the country level have been employed in all regressions.
Our main focus is on the effect of inequality lagged five years on the marginal tax rate.
This lag is convenient since it ensures that enough time has gone by for elections to take
place and new tax policies to be implemented. In addition, this makes our results more
comparable with related papers that aggregate the data in 5 year intervals (as Mohl and
Pamp 2009, or Shelton 2007). For robustness, we have also considered different lags (4 and
6 years). Table ?? presents our main results. Column 1 considers the relation between the
top marginal rate and inequality lagged five years, after imposing β2 = 0 in equation (??).
The coefficient of inequality is negative but not significant. In column 2, the same relation
is estimated, this time without imposing β2 = 0. According to the individual t-tests, both
β1 and β2 are significant, the former with a positive sign and the latter with a negative one,
just as the theory predicts.22 This implies that for moderate values of σ∗ (smaller than
1.34), the relation between the marginal tax rate and inequality is positive. It turns out
to be negative, however, for countries with large values of σ∗. The value 1.34 corresponds
approximately to the 74% percentile of the distribution of σ∗. The U.S., for instance, has
a value of σ∗ equal to 1.25 and, therefore, the model predicts a (small) positive relation
between inequality and the top tax rate.23
Instrumenting σ∗. As mentioned above, one caveat of the last regression is that the coef-
ficients might be biased due to endogeneity of the elasticity of substitution between private
22We can also reject the hypothesis that both coefficients are jointly zero, the p-value of the corresponding
F test being 0.003.
23See Appendix B for a list of countries and values of σ∗.
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and public goods. In order to find exogenous determinants of σ∗, we have explored the
history of the public health system. Its origins date back to the XIX century. At this time,
society was experiencing a profound transformation. Industrialization had brought about
a rapid urbanization process. The poverty and the lack of basic sanitation in the working
class districts of the growing cities provided efficient breeding grounds for communicable
diseases. Infants and young adults died in their millions of measles, whooping cough, small-
pox, diphteria, tuberculosis and diarrhea. However, the most devastating epidemics were
cholera and typhus that affected people in all age groups. Understanding epidemic diseases
in the new society and how to control them required a rethink. Traditional patterns of
quarantine and isolation employed in the control of plague proved to be inadequate. In
addition, diseases, specially cholera, created violence, rioting and social unrest. At the
end of the XIX century, European countries implemented the first state interventions to
control epidemics and improve sanitary conditions in mass urban populations, giving rise
to the public health system.
Among the many factors that contributed to this development, two seem key.24 One,
as mentioned above, is the rapid population increase in industrialized cities. The second,
is the expansion of trade during the nineteenth century, which was the most important
vehicle for the spread of cholera (Porter, 1999). The water-borne disease was carried by
sailors, traders and shipping workers. Service occupations involving water were always the
first groups to succumb.
The importance of trade in a country is connected to the availability of ports. Then, it
is reasonable to expect that the ratio of kilometers of coast line over total area, coast, is
positively related to maritime trade. This would imply that this variable is also positively
related to the development of the public health system and, therefore, inversely related to
σ∗. On the other hand, cities tend to develop and grow more in flat areas that are easily
accessible and well communicated. Thus, highly mountainous areas are in principle less
suitable for large scale urbanization. To capture this, we use the proportion of the country
that is mountainous according to the codings of geographer A. J. Gerard. This variable is
denoted as mount. We should expect a negative relation between this variable and the
24See Porter (1999) for a detailed analysis on this issue.
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development of large cities. This would imply a negative relation between mount and
the development of the public health system, which in turn, will generate a positive one
with σ∗. Finally, it is possible to create a third variable related to σ∗ by combining the
information in mount and coast. A simple way to do this is to consider the ratio of
the two, coast/mount. Given the previous pattern of correlation, we should expect a
negative relation between the latter variable and σ∗.25
The simple correlations between σ∗ and the above mentioned variables are -0.19, 0.14
and -0.15 for the coast, mount and coast/mount variables, respectively. Notice that
the sign of these correlations are in line with our initial guess.
To obtain potential instruments for Gt−jσ∗, we have multiplied the terrain variables by
lagged inequality. Provided lagged inequality is predetermined, its interaction with the
(exogeneous) terrain variables will also be so, implying that the exclusion restriction will
hold.
The simple correlations between Gt−5σ∗, and Gt−5coast, Gt−5coast/mount, and
Gt−5mount are -0.11, -0.11 and 0.12, respectively. Table ?? in Appendix B presents
the first stage regressions associated to these instruments. When introduced one by one
in the first stage regression, the three variables turn out to be significant (columns 1–3).
However, if the three of them are introduced at the same time only Gt−5coast is significant
(column 4 in Table ??). Accordingly, we have reestimated equation (??) using Gt−5coast
as instrument for Gt−5σ∗ and the output is presented in column 3 of Table ??. Although
the size of the coefficients differs considerably from those in column 2, the qualitative con-
clusions are very similar. Countries with values of σ∗ smaller than 1.26 present a positive
and significant relation between the top marginal tax rate and inequality and viceversa.26
This value of σ∗ (1.26) corresponds to the 72% percentile of the distribution. This implies
25Obviously, we could also consider the inverse of the previous variable (mount/count) as potential IV
and the same is true for mount and coast. We have actually tried the 6 potential IVs and the ones that
turned out to be more correlated with the endogenous variable according to the first stage regression are
three mentioned in the text.
26Using a F test, the null hypothesis of β1 = β2 = 0 can be rejected at the 10% level (p-value 0.0519). On
the other hand, tests of the hypothesis β2 = 0 robust to weak instruments –such as the Anderson-Rubin
test– still reject the null at conventional significance levels (p-value 0.024).
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Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Gt−5 2.494 27.248*** 78.877**
(8.384) (10.060) (33.221)
Gt−5σ∗ -20.224*** -62.404**
(6.166) (28.794)
Gt−4 7.006 35.479*** 72.175**
(8.813) (10.214) (34.831)
Gt−4σ∗ -23.321*** -53.378*
(6.311) (30.050)
Gt−6 -2.299 18.810* 73.525**
(8.157) (10.201) (32.771)
Gt−6σ∗ -16.975*** -60.976**
(5.774) (27.816)
gdppc 3.184 3.521 4.224 2.830 3.100 3.448 3.280 3.610 4.463
(3.537) (3.418) (3.316) (3.555) (3.442) (3.379) (3.581) (3.473) (3.305)
pop65 -0.147 -0.142 -0.132 -0.296 -0.334 -0.383 -0.040 -0.003 0.091
(0.634) (0.604) (0.591) (0.614) (0.580) (0.573) (0.655) (0.629) (0.606)
pop 2.071 1.712 0.963 1.798 1.264 0.575 1.828 1.768 1.612
(7.741) (7.363) (7.400) (7.946) (7.580) (7.646) (7.669) (7.335) (7.290)
democ -0.299 -0.283 -0.250 -0.245 -0.222 -0.191 -0.286 -0.279 -0.261
(0.215) (0.217) (0.234) (0.213) (0.216) (0.230) (0.218) (0.220) (0.235)
R2 0.587 0.596 0.557 0.583 0.594 0.576 0.589 0.596 0.549
Obs. 2097 2097 2097 2130 2130 2130 2058 2058 2058
C 126 126 126 127 127 127 127 127 127
Table 1. The relation between τ , σ∗ and G.
Notes. Dependent variable is the top marginal tax rate, τ . All regressions contain country
fixed effects and year dummies. Two stage least squares has been employed to obtain the
estimates in columns 3, 6 and 9, while the remaining models have been estimated using
standard fixed effects techniques. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
country level are reported in brackets.* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
that the list of countries with a positive or negative relation between the marginal tax rate
and inequality is basically identical as that implied by column 2.
Columns 4–9 are similar to columns 1–3, but this time inequality lagged 4 (columns 4–6)
and 6 years (columns 7–9) has been considered. The corresponding first-stage regressions
can be found in columns 5–9 of Table ?? in Appendix B. The conclusions are identical
to those described above: inequality is never significant when the restriction β2 = 0 is
imposed. However, a positive and significant coefficient is found for that variable when the
interaction of G and σ∗ is also introduced in the regression, whereas the interaction itself
has a negative and significant coefficient.
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We have also considered other lags of inequality. The results, not reported for the sake
of brevity, show that the relation between inequality and the tax rate is weaker for small or
for large values of j, resulting in estimates of β1and β2 that are not significantly different
from zero in most cases. We believe that this pattern of significance is broadly consistent
with our theory. Changes in inequality need some time to be realized and expressed so we
should not be able to find responses in the short run. Similarly, changes in inequality that
happened a long time ago might not be relevant any more since more recent events might
be motivating different responses.
4.3. The relation between the size of the state and inequality. In this section we
investigate the relationship between the size of the state, ϑ, and inequality. It follows
from expression (??) that ϑ is a decreasing function of γ. In addition, since γ can be
approximated by M/σ in most empirically relevant cases, as discussed in Section ??, it
follows that ϑ is also a decreasing function of M/σ. Although according to the model
presented in the previous sections this relation is not linear, it seems reasonable to consider
as a starting point whether a linear approximation can capture the implications of the
theory.
We use a similar framework to the one considered in the previous section. In this case
we estimate
(18) ϑit = β1Git−j + β2
Git−j
σ∗i
+ β3Xit−1 + µi + ηt + it.
In accordance with the theory, we should expect a value of β1 not significantly different
from zero together with a negative and significant value for β2, which would imply that
the marginal effect of inequality on the size of state is decreasing in σ in absolute value.
As in the previous section, we consider lagged values of inequality. One could expect that
the size of state would respond even slower than the tax rate to changes in inequality, since
implementing visible reductions or increases in this variable can take several years. For
this reason, we analyze the impact on the current size of the state of changes in inequality
occurring with a lag of 5, 6 and 7 years.
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Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Gt−5 -0.030 0.034 0.160
(0.033) (0.047) (0.122)
Gt−6 -0.041 0.024 0.183
(0.033) (0.049) (0.126)
Gt−7 -0.052 0.011 0.167
(0.032) (0.050) (0.127)
Gt−5/σ∗ -0.048** -0.154
(0.022) (0.098)
Gt−6/σ∗ -0.048** -0.175*
(0.023) (0.095)
Gt−7/σ∗ -0.045* -0.169*
(0.024) (0.092)
gdppc -0.000 -0.002 -0.016* 0.000 -0.001 -0.016* -0.000 -0.001 -0.014*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
pop65 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.003* 0.003* -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
pop -0.032 -0.039 -0.099** -0.035 -0.042* -0.104*** -0.041* -0.048** -0.106***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.039) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.022) (0.022) (0.034)
democ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.049 0.058 0.121 0.055 0.065 0.117 0.064 0.074 0.124
Obs. 2692 2692 1755 2640 2640 1728 2580 2580 1697
C 131 131 78 130 130 78 128 128 78
Table 2. The relation between the size of the state and in-
equality.
Notes. Dependent variable is the size of the state, ϑ. All regressions contain country fixed
effects and year dummies. Columns 3, 6 and 9 have been estimated using 2SLS while the
remaining columns use standard fixed effects techniques. Robust standard errors adjusted
for clustering are reported in brackets. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table ?? reports our estimates of equation (??). Columns 1, 4, and 7 present the results
obtained after imposing the restriction β2=0, for different lags of inequality (5 to 7 years).
The sign of the coefficients of Gt−j is always negative, but estimates are never significant.
If the restriction β2=0 is dropped (see columns 2, 5, and 8), the coefficients of Gt−j are still
not significant but those associated to Gt−5/σ∗ are positive and significant, as the theory
predicts.27
Since there are good reasons to suspect that σ∗ can be endogenous, we have constructed
instruments for Gt−j/σ∗ in a similar fashion as before. This time, we have divided (lagged)
27In all cases, the joint hypothesis of β1 = β2 = 0 can be rejected at the 5% significance level.
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inequality by the terrain variables introduced in the previous section. The first stage re-
gressions (see Table ?? in Appendix B) show that only Gt−jcoast/mount is significant
this time. Columns 3, 6 and 9 in Table ?? present estimates of (??) with Gt−j/σ∗ in-
strumented by Gt−jcoast/mount. As before, the inequality variable on its own is not
significant. However, (lagged) inequality divided by σ has a negative coefficient that is still
significant at the 10% level, (with the exception of the coefficient of Gt−5/σ∗ –column 3–,
for which the p-value is 0.11).28
We have also considered larger values j (namely, j={8, 9, 10}), and in these cases, the
significance of the interacted term tends to vanish, suggesting that changes that happen
too far back in time have no effect on the current size of the state.
Summarizing, the empirical results provide evidence supporting a negative relationship
between the size of the state and inequality, and this relationship seems to be weaker the
larger the value of where elasticity of substitution between privately and publicly provided
services.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have provided an integrated analysis of income taxation and public
expenditure. Individuals care about the reduction of their disposable income through
taxation, but also about the benefits they will receive from the goods and services supplied
by the government. How beneficial will public expenditure be to each particular tax payer
depends on the specific egalitarian bias of the expenditure policy, as this fixes the return
to the tax paid. We study the case where the political debate is on the distributional bias
of the expenditure policy and, once the bias has been chosen by majority voting, taxes
and size of government are adjusted to make them acceptable to the population. But at
this point, whether individuals accept more or less income taxation critically depends on
the substitutability between the publicly supplied and the market goods. The results are
identical when we assume that the size of government is the salient political issue and taxes
and bias in public expenditure are adapted accordingly.
28Similar results are obtained if techniques robust to weak instruments, as the Anderson-Rubin test, are
employed to for the significance of β2.
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The first prediction of our voting model is straightforward. Higher inequality will make
the median voter vote for more egalitarian expenditure policies. This result, however, has
two more subtle implications, once we take into account the readjustment of the other fiscal
policies. One is that the relationship between taxation and inequality is non-monotonic
because its sign depends on the degree of substitutability between the publicly and the
market supplied goods. The second one is that the relationship between inequality and the
chosen size of government is again mediated by the degree of substitutability: substitutabil-
ity reduces the marginal effect of inequality on the size of government. We empirically test
the two implications. The first result is remarkable because the literature has so far been
unable to identify a solid and significant relationship between inequality and taxation. The
second issue has not yet been so extensively studied in the literature. The few existing
empirical studies have tested a possible simple relationship between inequality and size of
government. Our model tells us that this has to be conditioned by the substitutability.
Indeed we find that while in isolation inequality does not have a significant role, we obtain
a significant relationship once inequality is adequately interacted with substitutability.
These two results underscore the critical importance of the substitutability between the
publicly and market supplied goods. In this paper we have taken just a first step and have
considered such a fundamental policy as exogenously given. In our view, the literature has
not given to this issue the relevance it deserves. In addition we don’t have good empirical
estimates of this substitutability. In the political as well as in the academic debate the issue
of privatising public services has been seen as an issue about improving the efficiency in the
management of a service. However, it is obvious that the more services are privatised the
less indispensable is the state and hence the higher the resistance to taxation. Developing
a full politico-economic model of privatizations is in our research agenda.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an arbitrary g¯ and an expedicture policy γ. For a tax function be acceptable
by an individual with income y it has to be that utility is maximal for β = 1 over all
the affine transforms defined in (??). Differentiating the utility with respect to β in (??),
equating it to zero, and evaluating at β = 1 we obtain
(19)
ux
(
y − t(y), γg¯ + (1− γ)t(y))
ug
(
y − t(y), γg¯ + (1− γ)t(y)) = 1− γ.
This expression implicitly defines t(y) as a function of income y, an arbitrary expenditure
g¯, and expenditure bias γ, ψ(y, g¯, γ). Since the tax function has to be consensual, the first
order condition (??) has to hold for all y. Integrating we find
t¯(g¯, γ) =
∫
ψ(y, g¯, γ)dF (y).
It is immediate that when g¯ = 0 the tax satisfying (??) is such that ψ(y, 0, γ) > 0 for
all y. Hence,
∫
ψ(y, 0, γ)dF (y) > 0 = g¯. On the other hand, since from (??) we know
that ψ(y, g¯, γ) < y for all y and g¯, for g¯ = µ it has to be that
∫
ψ(y, µ, γ)dF (y) < g¯ = µ.
Furthermore, it is easy to check that ∂t(y)
∂g¯
< 0. Hence, there exists a unique budget
balancing g¯∗ such that
t¯(g¯∗, γ) =
∫
ψ(y, g¯∗, γ)dF (y) = g¯∗.
Hence, the unique consensual tax function is t(y, γ) = ψ(y, g¯∗, γ).
Proof of Proposition 2
In Proposition ?? we have obtained the condition for individual acceptability of a tax
function, conditional on the net tax revenue and the expenditure policy. Since the fiscal
policy has to be balanced, we have that t¯ = ϑµ. Therefore, we can write t(y) = ψ(y, ϑµ, γ),
where γ is arbitrary.
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If t(y) is universally acceptable this condition has to be satisfied by all incomes. Hence,
we have that
(20) tˆ(ϑµ, γ) =
∫
ψ(y, ϑµ, γ)dF (y).
We now show that there is a unique γ∗ such that
∫
ψ(y, ϑµ, γ∗)dF (y) = ϑµ, so that
t∗(y) = ψ(y, ϑµ, γ∗).
We start by observing that ψ(y, ϑµ, γ) is continuous in γ. From the first order condition
(??) we can easily obtain that tˆ(ϑµ, γ)→ −∞ as γ → 1. Furthermore, for γ = 0, for every
y (??) becomes
[
ux (y − t(y), t(y))
]− [ug (y − t(y), t(y)) ] = 0,
so that tˆ(ϑµ, 0) = zˆµ, where zˆ is as defined in (??).
Therefore, a γ∗ exists such that for every ϑ ∈ [0, zˆ] we have that tˆ = ϑµ.
To prove uniqueness we shall show that tˆ is strictly decreasing in γ.
Totally differentiating (??) with respect to t(y) and to γ we obtain{−uxx + 2(1− γ)uxg − (1− γ)2ugg} dt(y) + {ug + [t¯− t(y)][uxg − (1− γ)ugg]}dγ = 0.
Noting now that
∂ug
∂t(y)
= −uxg + (1− γ)ugg,
and that by, Assumption ??,
t(y)[uxg − (1− γ)ugg] < ug,
we obtain that dt(y)
dγ
< 0. Hence,
dtˆ(ϑµ, γ)
dγ
< 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Using Proposition 1 in Gans and Smart (1996), a sufficient condition for the existence
of a majority voting equilibrium is that the consensus tax function t(y) be increasing in y
for all possible γ.
By differentiating in (??) we can readily obtain that this condition is indeed met as
(21)
dt(y)
dy
=
−uxx + (1− γ)uxg
−uxx + 2uxg − (1− γ)2ugg > 0.
This establishes existence.
We obtain the characterization of the chosen policy by differentiating the individual
utility with respect to γ to get
du(x(y), g(y))
dγ
= ux
dx(y)
dγ
+ ug
dg(y)
dγ
.
Since the tax is consensual we can use (??) to obtain
du(x(y), g(y))
dγ
= ug
[dg(y)
dγ
+ (1− γ)dx(y)
dγ
]
.
We know that
dx(y)
dγ
= −dt(y)
dγ
and that
dg(y)
dγ
=
(
t¯− t(y))+ γ dt¯
dγ
+ (1− γ)dt(y)
dγ
.
Hence,
(22)
du(x(y), g(y))
dγ
= ug
dt¯
dγ
[
γ − t¯− t(y)− dt¯
dγ
]
.
Bearing in mind that dt¯
dγ
< 0, if we denote by yˆ the solution to t(yˆ) = t¯, we have that
du(x(y),g(y))
dγ
< 0 for all y > yˆ. Consequently, all individuals with y ≥ yˆ will prefer γ(y) = 0.
Further, all individuals with y < yˆ will prefer some γ(y) < 1. In particular, this will be
true of the individual with the median income.
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With respect to voting over the size of government, it is straightforward that quasitran-
sitivity of the majority preference relationship also holds true when the preference relation
is defined over ϑ. This is because in this case we continue to require that (??) be positive
now for all possible t¯, as it clearly is the case.
Appendix B
Variable [Obs] [Mean] [StdDev] [Min] [Max]
τ 2130 39.734 14.526 0.000 90.000
ϑ 2692 0.154 0.058 0.014 0.504
σ∗ 2692 1.092 0.982 0.125 6.591
Gt 2692 0.444 0.088 0.227 0.773
Gtσ
∗ 2082 0.497 0.440 0.036 3.047
Gt/σ
∗ 2692 0.741 0.571 0.052 2.948
gdppc 2692 8.647 1.195 5.829 10.815
pop65 2692 7.765 4.893 1.854 21.406
pop 2692 16.420 1.473 13.383 21.004
democ 2692 6.026 3.886 0.000 10.000
coast 2097 10.028 20.484 0.000 142.045
mount 2097 7.670 8.737 0.000 51.268
coast/mount 1723 2.238 9.043 0.000 83.874
Table B.1. Summary statistics.
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Albania 1.338 Kyrgyzstan 1.178
Algeria 0.305 Lao PDRepublic 3.055
Argentina 0.921 Latvia 0.760
Armenia 2.412 Lebanon 1.883
Australia 0.498 Lesotho 0.907
Austria 0.320 Lithuania 0.386
Azerbaijan 3.901 Madagascar 0.570
Bangladesh 1.708 Malawi 1.104
Belarus 0.330 Malaysia 1.022
Belgium 0.349 Mali 1.327
Bhutan 0.397 Mauritania 0.482
Bolivia 0.556 Mauritius 0.902
Botswana 0.554 Mexico 1.229
Brazil 1.390 Mongolia 0.267
Bulgaria 0.605 Morocco 2.362
Burkina Faso 1.222 Mozambique 0.440
Burundi 1.649 Namibia 0.729
Cambodia 2.903 Nepal 2.550
Cameroon 3.793 Netherlands 0.471
Canada 0.424 New Zealand 0.290
Central African Republic 1.639 Nicaragua 0.853
Chad 1.410 Niger 0.910
Chile 0.892 Norway 0.200
China 1.389 Pakistan 3.097
Colombia 0.309 Panama 0.481
Costa Rica 0.350 Papua New Guinea 0.206
Croatia 0.177 Paraguay 1.565
Cyprus 1.393 Peru 0.749
Czech Republic 0.125 Philippines 1.542
Cote d’Ivoire 3.303 Poland 0.419
Denmark 0.203 Portugal 0.441
Djibouti 0.476 Republic of Korea 1.109
Dominican Republic 2.316 Republic of Moldova 0.835
Ecuador 1.437 Romania 0.420
Egypt 1.559 Russian Federation 0.588
El Salvador 1.139 Rwanda 1.180
Estonia 0.250 Senegal 1.447
Ethiopia 0.794 Serbia 0.388
Fiji 0.504 Sierra Leone 1.854
Finland 0.376 Singapore 1.782
France 0.260 Slovakia 0.256
Gabon 0.760 Slovenia 0.355
Gambia 1.567 South Africa 1.528
Georgia 5.984 Spain 0.396
Germany 0.267 Sri Lanka 1.181
Ghana 1.459 Swaziland 0.663
Greece 0.748 Sweden 0.197
Guatemala 1.772 Switzerland 0.760
Guinea 6.591 Tajikistan 2.961
Guinea-Bissau 2.896 Thailand 0.693
Guyana 0.184 Macedonia 0.399
Haiti 2.766 Trinidad and Tobago 1.071
Honduras 0.762 Tunisia 0.918
Hungary 0.358 Turkey 0.445
India 3.046 Turkmenistan 0.504
Indonesia 1.520 Uganda 2.580
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1.245 Ukraine 0.780
Ireland 0.322 United Kingdom 0.231
Israel 0.617 United Republic of Tanzania 1.146
Italy 0.358 United States of America 1.250
Jamaica 0.904 Uruguay 0.856
Japan 0.225 Uzbekistan 1.022
Jordan 0.816 Venezuela 1.486
Kazakhstan 0.671 VietNam 2.117
Kenya 1.373 Yemen 1.319
Zambia 0.706
Table B.2. Countries and values of σ∗
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Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Gt−5 1.350*** 0.930*** 1.384*** 1.177***
(0.162) (0.183) (0.161) (0.332)
Gt−5coast -0.006** -0.009**
(0.003) (0.004)
Gt−5mount 0.017* 0.012
(0.001) (0.013)
Gt−5coast/mount -0.015*** 0.006
(0.005) (0.008)
Gt−4 1.223*** 1.336***
(0.324) (0.158)
Gt−4coast -0.008** -0.005**
(0.004) (0.003)
Gt−4mount 0.009
(0.012)
Gt−4coast/mount 0.005
(0.008)
Gt−6 1.170*** 1.382***
(0.350) (0.174)
Gt−6coast -0.010** -0.007**
(0.004) (0.003)
Gt−6mount 0.013
(0.013)
Gt−6coast/mount 0.008
(0.008)
gdppc 0.025 0.017 0.007 0.005 -0.001 0.019 0.009 0.028
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019)
pop65 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
pop 0.029 -0.012 -0.024 -0.002 -0.012 0.020 0.016 0.046
(0.061) (0.064) (0.084) (0.079) (0.074) (0.058) (0.081) (0.064)
democ 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.613 0.634 0.619 0.644 0.644 0.615 0.644 0.609
Obs 2097 2097 1723 1723 1753 2130 1691 2058
C 126 126 104 104 105 127 105 127
Table B.3. The relation between τ , σ∗ and G: first stage re-
gressions.
Notes. Dependent variables are Gt−5σ∗, Gt−4σ∗ and Gt−6σ∗ in columns 1–4, 5–6 and
7–8, respectively. All regressions contain country fixed effects and year dummies. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering are reported in brackets. * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***
p<.01
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Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Gt−5 1.625*** 1.238*** 1.631***
(0.192) (0.129) (0.190)
Gt−5mount/coast -0.345
(0.238)
Gt−5/mount 0.044
(0.001)
Gt−5mount/coast -0.029**
(0.011)
Gt−6 1.644*** 1.247*** 1.650***
(0.197) (0.130) (0.190)
Gt−6/coast -0.352
(0.240)
Gt−6/mount 0.043
(0.061)
Gt−6mount/coast -0.030***
(0.011)
Gt−7 1.687*** 1.270*** 1.686***
(0.199) (0.131) (0.187)
Gt−7mount/coast -0.367
(0.243)
Gt−7/mount 0.043
(0.061)
Gt−7mount/coast -0.031***
(0.011)
gdppc -0.040* -0.021 -0.021 -0.034 -0.021 -0.017 -0.029 -0.025 -0.016
(0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.016) (0.019)
pop65 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.010 -0.009 -0.006 -0.014* -0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
pop -0.101 -0.170 -0.137 -0.105 -0.186** -0.144* -0.110 -0.205*** -0.156**
(0.079) (0.085) (0.089) (0.077) (0.081) (0.084) (0.074) (0.076) (0.077)
democ 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.664 0.608 0.663 0.663 0.605 0.664 0.669 0.612 0.673
Obs 2127 2226 1755 2095 2181 1728 2057 2130 1697
C 95 109 78 95 108 78 95 106 78
Table B.4. The relation between τ , σ∗ and G: first stage re-
gressions.
Notes. Dependent variables are Gt−5/σ∗, Gt−6/σ∗ and Gt−7/σ∗ in columns 1–3, 4–6 and
7–9, respectively. All regressions contain country fixed effects and year dummies. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering are reported in brackets. * p<.10, ** p<.05, ***
p<.01
